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This thesis carefully examines the fire support process
at Army corps level to determine how to improve the effec-
tiveness of the fire support system. Such an investigation
has been motivated by recent technological advances in
automatic data-processing equipment and weaponry. Despite
the high potential of these advances, U.S. military opera-
tional capabilities have not been significantly improved.
First, a review of the current components and expected
future developments of the corps fire support process are
presented. Next, a total systems approach is utilized to
delineate key problems and to propose viable solutions.
Recommendations are made which should facilitate implemen-
tation of beneficial changes in corps fire support develop-
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Shortly after 0400 hours on Sunday, 4 August (1985), it
became clear to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe,
and was at once made known throughout a world waiting
in an agony of suspense, that the Warsaw Pact had opened
a general offensive against the forces of the Atlantic
Alliance. The invasion of Western Europe had begun.
General Sir John Hackett
THE THIRD WORLD WAR, AUGUST 1985
While the above incident is fictitious, it accurately
depicts the major concern of the NATO forces in Western
Europe. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. has
turned toward this threat and made the defense of Europe its
first priority. As such, the European scenario presents a
very dismal picture. Although force ratio estimates of
Warsaw Pact forces versus NATO forces vary, an alarming
ratio of, at least, two-to-one is an established fact. To
add to this niimerical advantage , the Soviet Union has in
recent years spent a significantly high proportion of their
GNP in modernizing their weapons and associated military
equipment. Consequently, many observers believe that the
Warsaw Pact is qualitatively, as well as quantitatively,
superior to NATO forces.
Until recently, qualitative improvements to the Soviet
I
forces have not been officially acknov/ledged by U.S.
military or civilian leaders. Instead, the consensus
indicated unwavering faith in the supremacy of American
12

technology, tactics and the spirit of the fighting man which
could overcome any quantitative advantage the Soviets might
possess. A recent estimate by Dr. Percy A. Pierre, Assist-
ant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and
Acquisition, has indicated that "today the U.S. Army is
inferior in virtually every major category of equipment and
weapons required to wage and win wars" ^Ref 1, p. SOj . If
this is true, the security of the U.S. and the free world
is categorically endangered.
This thesis was not written to debate this issue.
Instead, it examined ongoing U.S. Army research, develop-
ment and c^cquisition efforts in the area of corps fire
support, evaluated their sufficiency, and suggests possible
improvements. Key in this analysis was the careful
identification of the factors which have prevented advanced
U.S. technological capabilities from enhancing U.S. military
operational capabilities . The existence of this problem
area has openly been acknowledged. During a recent manage-
ment review by the U.S. Army Material Development and
Readiness Command (DARCOM) , it was revealed that at least
fifty percent of intensively managed items were behind
production schedule. In most of these cases, the schedules
had been previously extended. The final result has often
been the development of systems incorporating technology
eight to txvelve years old. General John R. Guthrie, DARCOM
commander, has described the situation as a "crisis of
caring", faulting both the Army and American industry
[kef 2, p. 3l] .
13

Technological improvements may be considered in two
basic categories. The first category could contain new
equipment and weaponry, such as new tanks, aircraft, fight-
ing vehicles and artillery. Detailed analysis of this
category would be far beyond the scope of this thesis.
This first category was dealt with, however, as it related
3to the second category composed of C I-type systems
(Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence). In
particular, this area has been intimately connected to the
revolutionary automatic data-processing (ADP) technology
which has characterized this past decade. Manifested by
such innovations as mini-computers, computer graphics and
light pens, the capability to process vast amounts of
information swiftly and accurately could be invalixable on
the modern battlefield. It is through the refinement and
interpretation of this information that commanders will be
able to allocate their combat resources to achieve a more
favorable combat ratio at the decisive time and place in
battle. In general, combat ratios consider effective fire-
power, both direct and indirect. Since direct firepower
such as tanks, infantry weapons and the like are engaged at
the lower echelons of command, it is not usually feasible
to reallocate their effects in the short-term. Thus,
indirect firepower in the form of long-range cannon, rocket
and missile artillery becomes increasingly important in
determining battle outcome. In addition, combat power from
tactical aircraft and naval gunfire assets, if available,
14

can also be utilized to support the attainment of army force
objectives. In the current army organizational hierarchy,
the place where these types of firepower are allocated is
at the army corps . This organization and its proposed
technological improvements will be analyzed in this thesis.
Chapter II serves as the foundation from which the
analysis of this thesis is built. Briefly, it exajnines the
current army corps headquarters and its fire support proc-
ess. From this base level of understanding. Chapter III
proceeds to overlay the existing structure with the techno-
logical advances expected to be developed to augment the
corps fire support mechanism. Thus, these two chapters are
designed to work, in effect, in tandem in explaining the
situation studied.
Chapter IV critically analyzes the problems or obstruc-
tions which have impeded the development of an effective
decision support system for corps fire support. Chapter V
proposes possible solutions to the problems presented in the
previous chapter and is, therefore, the mainstay of this
work. Chapter VI includes general conclusions derived from
this analysis and recommendations intended to outline some
of the actions needed to enhance corps fire support. It
attempts to answer the perplexing question, which probably
exists in many large organizations, of how to solve identi-
fied problems.
The methodology utilized in this analysis could be best
categorized as a multi-disciplined approach. Indeed, the
15

complexity and dynamism of the corps fire support enigma has
indicated that a single organizational, or procedioral
,
oriented theory will not suffice. Thus, fields such as
management theory, operations research, systems analysis,
public policy and information theory have been drawn upon,
where applicable. As might be predicted, the recommended
methodology to resolve the corps fire support enigma is also
based on a multi-disciplined, or "total systems," approach.
It is acknowledged that resolution of the corps fire
support enigma will not, by itself, insure that the U.S.
military community will succeed in meeting the Soviet
threat. Indeed, this is representative of the uncertainties
which characteristically accompany a hostile, combat
environment. It is hoped that through an intensified effort
to understand and resolve the intricacies of corps fire
support, insight v/ill be obtained that will assist in the
development of additional methodologies that will enhance
military effectiveness and, hence, national security.
16

II. CURRENT BASIS FOR CORPS FIRE SUPPORT MANAGEMENT
The U.S. Army maintains four complete, active-army,
corps headqxaarters . These are the XVIII Airborne Corps,
located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; III Corps, located at
Fort Hood, Texas; and V Corps and VII Corps, both located in
the Federal Republic of Germany. Additionally, U.S. forces
share the command of a fifth corps in the form of a combined
Republic of Korea-U.S. Corps headquarters called the I Corps
(ROK/U.S.) Group. An army corps is commanded by a
Lieutenant-General (three star), and consists of a head-
quarters, three to five maneuver divisions, an organic corps
support command (COSCOM) and additional ixnits as its mission
demands. This flexibility in composition allox\;s this
organization to be tailored to the various worldwide contin-
gency plans which U.S. forces must be prepared to implement.
A typical corps in the European scenario might be configured
as shown in Table I.
Additionally, an army corps is given an apportionment
of the Tactical Air Force (TACAIR) assets in the theater of
operation in the form of TACAIR Close Air Support (CAS)
Sorties [Ref 3, p. 3-| . Through careful allocation and
coordination of the air and artillery (retained under corps
control) firepower, the corps commander attempts to influ-
ence the outcome of the battle. To facilitate the under-





1. Headquarters (Corps Staff)
2. Divisions*:
Two Armored Divisions
One Mechanized Infantry Division
One Infantry Division
3. Field Artillery Brigade:
Two 155mm Howitzer, self-propelled, Battalions
Two Sinch Howitzer, self-propelled. Battalions
One 175mm Gun, self-propelled, Battalion
Two Lance Missile Battalions
4. Armored Cavalry Regiment*
5. Army Aviation Group
6. Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Separate)*
7. Air Defense Group




11. Military Police Group
12. Combat Electronic V/arfare Intelligence Group (CEWI)
Note: Organizations annotated (*) have their
own organic combat arms, combat support
and combat service support elements to
facilitate their designated mission.
For example, they possess units such as




headquarters is tactically organized, the conceptual/




The field location of the corps headquarters is referred
to as the corps main command post (MAIN CP). Its physical
configuration is called the Corps Tactical Operations Center
(CTOC). As described in Department of the Army Field Manual
101-5, the CTOC is a "command installation in which communi-
cation facilities and personnel are centralized to control
and coordinate tactical operations" [Ref 4, p. J-2 • Key in
the successful functioning of this organization is the
integration of land and air-based combat power into the
commander's concept of operations. Continuous operational
decisions and long-range planning further characterize this
process
.
The physical setup of the CTOC will vary considerably
among different Corps, based on the type of equipment
authorized. In the European Corps, for example, five- ton
expansible vans are utilized to contain the various staff
elements. In the Airborne Corps, light-weight tents with
the capability of being interconnected are utilized. In
addition, the CTOC could be established in a building, or




Regardless of physical variations, CTOCs are functional-
ly similar. Figure 1 depicts a typical functional layout
of the CTOC at a r4AIN CP location. The staff elements shown
are identified in the Table of Acronyms. Those sections
directly involved in the fire support allocation process are
described in more detail in Table II.




Summary of Fire Support CTOC Elements




Plan and coordinate the total fire
support effort on surface targets
for the Corps and provide tactical
control of corps field artillery
units retained directly unUer corps
Plans for conventional and nuclear
weapons employment.
Supervises and coordinates overall
tactical operations, both current
(G-3 OPS) and future (G-3 Plans).
G-2, Intelligence Coordinates all intelligence gather-
ing activities and disseminates data
to other staff elements and subor-
dinate echelons of command.
G-3 , Air Operations Recommends employment of CAS
resources. Insures integration of
CAS with the ground tactical plan.





Uses special intelligence sources to




An Air Force officer working
(physically) next to the FAS.






An Air Force facility - provides a
quick-reaction capability to satisfy
immediate requests for tactical air






Evaluates impact of friendly and
enemy chemical or nuclear employment
on the corps plan of operation.
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The corps Chief of Staff, a Brigadier-General (one-star)
position, is responsible for overall CTOC coordination and
accomplishment of the staff assigned responsibilities. The
physical layout of the CTOC and intra-staff work-flow are
within his purview. He is assisted in these tasks by the
Corps G-3 (operations) who has overall staff responsibility
to coordinate and integrate available combat support with
the tactical operations. The next section describes the
conceptual environment within which the CTOC functions.
B. CONCEPTS/DOCTRINE
The piecemeal construction of this section reflects the
veritable state of the subject matter. There does not exist
a detailed, written document which adequately delineates the
complex area of corps fire support. The closest approxima-
tion to this desirable entity is Department of the Army
Field Manual 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations
fkef 5} , This manual does cover the general subject matter;
and division level, and below, fire support. It fails at
the corps level, however, for reasons which will be
explained in Chapter IV. The following subsections are not
meant to encompass all of the concepts or doctrine that
necessarily could apply to corps fire support. They do,
however, briefly describe the primary conceptual issues
pertaining to corps fire support.
1 , Principles of War
The so-called, principles of war are considered by
22

most military men to capture the essence of military wisdom.
In very general terms, they are guidelines for achieving
success on the battlefield which have been established over
years of trial and error. These principles of war (jRef 6,
p. 2J are usually not explicitly connected with fire support,
per se. However, they are clearly relevant and, therefore,
are listed in Table III.
2 . Fire Support Planning Versus Fire Support
Coordination
Fire support planning is "the continuous and con-
current process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling fire
support and integrating it with maneuver to optimize combat
power. Fire support coordination is the continuing process
of implementing fire support planning and managing the fire
support assets that support maneuver forces" iRef 5, p. 3-5J .
Stated another way, fire support planning is the written or
verbal expression of how fire support is proposed to be
employed versus fire support coordination which is the real-
time, actions that result in firepower on a designated
target on the battlefield. Table IV contains the basic
principles of fire support coordination (Ref 7, p. 31/ which
the Field Artillery Section in the CTOC should consider in
the allocation of fires. Figure 2 shows the corps fire sup-
port process. It intentionally emphasizes the centrality of


















Direct all efforts towards a
decisive obtainable goal.
Seize, retain and exploit the
initiative
.
For every mission there should
be unity of effort under one
responsible commander.
Achieve superiority in combat
power at the decisive place and
time
.
Allocate the minimiira essential
combat power to secondary
efforts.
Position your military
resources to insure the
accomplishment of your mission.
Accomplish your purpose before
your enemy can react
effectively.




Prepare uncomplicated plans and






Principles of Fire Support Coordination
1. Consider the use of all fire support available . The •
capabilities and limitations of each type of fire
support means must be considered to determine the most
appropriate and effective means available.
2. Provide rapid coordination . Procedures must be
established and practiced to effect rapid coordination




Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective
support. Targets should be passed to the lowest
echelons that have the means to engage them. If targets
passed to the Corps FAS are in a divisional zone of
action, the target should be sent to the division Fire
Support Element,
4. Avoid unnecessary duplication . Fire support resources
should not be wasted by the "overkilling" of targets.
5. Coordination at all echelons . The utilization of fire
support means at all levels must be efficiently
coordinated to insure fire support assets are optimized
6. Coordinate airspace . Cannon and missile firing
trajectories must be identified to Army aircraft and CAS
aircraft to insure friendly aircraft are not endangered,
7. Provide safeguards to friendly units . Positive measures
must be implemented to insure friendly forces are not




Figure 2. Corps Fire Support Process
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3. Target Intelligence Versus Combat Intelligence
The distinction between target intelligence and
combat intelligence is one of the most important concepts in
the corps fire support process. Unfortunately, it is also
the most misunderstood concept. Combat or tactical intel-
ligence is general knowledge of the enemy, the weather and
the geographical terrain. It aids the commander in the
planning and execution of combat operations. Target intel-
ligence is detailed, accurate and timely knowledge of the
location, size and mobility of specific enemy combat, combat
support or combat service support units [Ref 8, p. 3-3^ .
Target intelligence, understandably, is much more difficult
to obtain than the general knowledge of enemy dispositions
which is sought in combat intelligence. The salient point
is that target intelligence, not combat intelligence, is
required to effectively utilize firepower to engage the
enemy. Thus, the FAS must receive target intelligence if
corps fire support assets are to be adroitly employed.
4. Counterfire Concept
The counterfire concept evolved in the 1976-77 time-
frame and unraistakenly precipitated several major changes in
corps fire support structure and doctrine. The overall
concept is that the attack of enemy indirect fire systems,
called counterfire, should be transferred from corps level
to division level, and below. The rationale was based on a
study sponsored by the Army Training and Doctrine Command
27

(TRADOC) on the Central European battle scenario (Central
Battle). Initial feedback from SCORES (Scenario Oriented
Recurring Evaluation System) indicated, that normally corps-
retained, field artillery cannon assets should be transferred
to subordinate divisions. Increased corps frontages, over-
extended communications and increased density of targets dur-
ing the early stages (through "D+4" days) of combat, supported
the argument that the preponderance of combat power be
within the immediate grasp of division commanders, who would
,
fight the battle . This concept and the Nunn Amendment led to
the deactivation of all corps artillery Headquarters and
Headquarters batteries (199 personnel) which were tradition-
ally part of the corps level units. In its place, the FAS
(47 personnel) was formed and made a part of the Corps
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC).
5. Battlefield Interdiction
In the two year interim since counterfire was
conceived, the Army has done a partial turn-around in its
design of the doctrine for corps fire support. 'V/hen SCORES
Europe I, Sequence 2A, and the Europe Short-Warning Scenarios
were performed, it was discovered that post D+4 operations
reestablished the need for Corps level control of fire-
power assets. In particular, corps will execute battlefield
interdiction with long-range firepower such as TACAIR and
Lance missile fires. Battlefield Interdiction intends to
engage enemy second echelon forces not yet in battle. The
28

theory underlying this concept is that Battlefield Interdic-
tion will degrade the combat momenttim of the threat and
effectively prevent the second echelon forces from becoming
a first echelon problem jllef 9, p. 3} .
C. CURRENT WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY
As Figure 2 depicts, corps fire support could be consi-
dered as having three major components: input, processor,
and output. V/ith that logic, this section lists major equip-
ment and technology, comprising current corps fire support.
1 . Input Category
The corps fire support decision process is nourished
by several intelligence collection agencies. The bulk of
target intelligence is obtained from the corps G-2 and the
All-Source Analysis Center (ASAC). These agencies collect
and process classified intelligence data from a variety of
sources, such as national level assets, the corps CEWI
group, the Air Force Direct Air Support Center (DASC), and
intelligence passed from the subordinate divisions. This
data is derived from three general types of surveillance
systems. These systems monitor the enemy through sophis-
ticated electronic sensors, detecting radio communications;
imagery sensors, such as photographic equipment mounted on
overhead aircraft and satellites; and hxjman observation
means, such as clandestine agents located behind enemy
lines. Each of these area are composed of many types of
29

subsystems. For example, imagery intelligence gained
through employment of the OV-1 , fixed-wing, aircraft could
include radar, infrared and high-resolution photographic
sensors. At corps level, these types of intelligence must
be collated. Target intelligence must be extracted in a
timely fashion and passed to the Field Artillery Section for
fire support processing.
2 . Processing Category
The FAS, as previously stated, is the focal point
for the corps fire support effort for the corps for both nu-
clear and conventional weaponry. It also provides tactical
control for those field artillery units retained directly
under corps. The exact composition and functioning of the
FAS has not been totally agreed upon by the Field Artillery
Center and School, located at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and the
active-army, corps organizations. The current (June 197 9)
proposed organization is found in Draft Field Manual 6-20-2.
The reason for this discord is that the FAS organization is
relatively new. FAS is a 47-person staff section which was
first authorized worldwide in the 1978-79 timeframe. Prior
to the FAS authorization, the fire support coordination
center (FSCC) at corps level was called the Fire Support
Element (FSE), a 19-person section.
The FAS, though larger, is not appreciably different
than the FSE in terms of its basic functions. Thus, it must
30

be emphasized that the FAS was not a revolutionary change
to the intra-staff relationships existing in CTOC
organizations. Yet, the FAS does have the potential to
greatly enhance the timeliness, accuracy and efficiency of
the corps fire support process. This potential will not be
realized, however, unless it is properly designed and
intensively managed.
Table V shows a FAS organization, originally
designed in 1977 by this writer, v/hich was subsequently
field-tested and adopted by the XVIII Airborne Corps FAS at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This FAS version consists of
three elements, each functionally modified from the original
concept and current draft versions. These elements are a
Headquarters Element (HQ), a Fire Support/Operations Element
(FSOE) and a Target Intelligence Element (TIE). As
indicated in Table V, the FAS is headed by a Brigadier-
General who is considered to be the Corps Commander's Fire
Support Coordinator (FSCOORD). The FAS contains 17
commissioned officers and 30 enlisted men. The Headquarters
Element provides the personal staff for the FSCOORD, as well
as administrative and logistical personnel who specifically
monitor the status of corps field artillery units. The FSOE
performs the operational aspects of the fire support
planning and coordination functions. The TIE, as the
acronym indicates, links the FSOE v/ith the intelligence-






FA Officer/FSCOORD - Brigadier General
Deputy FA Officer - Colonel
Enlisted Aide - Senior Enlisted
Secretary-Steno - "
Chauffer - Junior Enlisted
Vehicle Driver It
FIRE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ELEMENT
Asst. FSCOORD - Lieutenant Colonel
FA Operations Officer - Major
Two Team Chiefs - Major
FA Logistics Officer - Major
Asst. FA OPS Officer - Captain
Four Target Analysts - Captain
Operations Sergeant - Senior Enlisted
Four Asst. OPS SGTs
Ammunition Supply SGT -
Four Operations Sp . - Junior Enlisted
Two Clerk Typists - "
Senior Radio Operator - "





FA Intelligence Off. - Major
Target Acquisition Off- Major
FA Operations Off. - Captain
Two Asst. FA Intel Off- Captain
Intelligence SGT - Senior Enlisted
Two Tgt Acq/Intel SGTs- "
Two Tgt Acq/Intel Sp. - Junior Enlisted
Two Clerk Typists - "
Chief Surveyor - Senior Enlisted
Three Survey Computers- "
NOTE: Senior Enlisted means pay grades E6 to E9
Junior Enlisted means pay grades E3 to E6
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personnel are located with the ASAC and the G-2 sections to
facilitate the dissemination of target intelligence. The
remaining portion of the TIE must be collocated with the
FSOE to insure a coordinated effort is achieved.
The FAS, as was the FSE, is composed of Field
Artillery branch officers and enlisted men, working in
t^^^elve-hour shifts on a continuous, 24 hours per day basis.
The equipment and methods currently used in the FAS to
maintain the status of corps fire support assets and to
allocated targets to the appropriate fire support means are
essentially identical to those used in World War II. For
example, maps with acetate overlays are used to depict the
location of field artillery units and to indicate their
range limitations. From manual equipment such as this, the
FAS must decide how to best allocate their fire support
assets. As will be covered in Chapter III, there are more
sophisticated means being developed. The current state-of-
the-art is, at best, marginally sufficient,
3 . Output Category
As shown in Figure 2, there are several possible
outputs among which the FAS must decide. Of those shown,
only tactical air support (TACAIR) and artillery (Lance and
cannon artillery) retained under corps control will be
discussed in this section. Naval gunfire (NGF) will not be
covered since it is only available in specialized circtim-
stances and not anticipated in the European scenario.
33
X
Targets may be passed to subordinate divisions. Divisional
fire support assets should be then allocated, if available.
a. Availability of TACAIR
The availability of TACAIR sorties depends upon
time of day and delivery rest'^ictions . For example,
conditions such as night, low visibility weather and lox\;
survivability due to enemy air defenses may limit corps fire
support assets to solely indirect fire, field artillery
weapons. The possible combinations of aircraft and ordnance
loads are so numerous that the selection of air assets to be
used on a particular target has been reserved for the Air
Force
.
b. Availability of Artillery
Indirect fire support weapons, organic to field
artillery battalions, are assigned to corps along with a
number of field artillery (FA) brigade headcruarters accord-
ing to the mission needs of the corps. Table I shov/ed a
possible composition of a, corps-assigned, FA brigade. The
primary purpose of FA brigades is to augment division fires
and reduce the span of control over the artillery assets.
The fire support available to the FAS depends on what assets
are retained under corps control. Normally, the Corps
Commander is advised by the Corps Fire Support Coordinator
(FSCOORD) to allocate the firepower of the corps' cannon
artillery battalions to the divisions. This can be
accomplished by attaching the FA brigades to the divisions,
or by giving them what is knownn as a standard tactical
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mission of "reinforcing " the division artillery. Regard-
less of how this is done, the result is that corps retains
the Lance missile battalions as their sole source of field
artillery support. This is entirely logical in that
current U.S. cannon artillery have maximum range
capabilities which are well within division target
acquisition range. Thus, cannon artillery support would,
in most cases, be more responsive by closer association
with the division level.
A Lance missile battalion has three missile
firing batteries, each with two missile launchers. Thus,
two Lance missile battalions would have a total of twelve
launchers. The Lance missile is a long-range, all weather,
day-night, nuclear or conventional, highly mobile, guided
missile system. It can fire an improved conventional
munition (ICM) warhead section on its missile main
assemblage from 8 to 65 kilometers. Since Lance is
normally employed at least 15 kilometers behind the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA), maximxim effective range of
Lance fires is approximately 50 kilometers. The ICM
warhead carries 830 BLU-63 bomblets that are dispersed in
flight over a large target area and are highly effective
against soft targets and some hard targets. \\fhen
authorized, Lance can also fire its nuclear warhead up to
a distance of 110 kilometers £^Ref IcO .
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III. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF CORPS FIRE SUPPORT
As identified in Chapter I, the European threat has been
firmly established as the primary scenario influencing U.S.
military thinking. With this as the main justification,
the Department of Defense budgetary request for FY 1980
included approximately $13.6 billion for research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation (RDT & E) and $35.4 billion for
the procT-irement of weapon systems and other military equip-
ment and supplies QRef 11, p. 2j . This chapter extracts
from the myriad of RDT & E expenditures; projects ivhich
relate to the corps fire support process. As will be
evident, these relatively few projects are in various stages
of the developmental process. Operational fielding of most
of the equipment and systems is expected in the 1982-1989
timefrsime. Additionally, salient tactical concepts and
doctrine that have been, or appear to be, evolving will be
briefly described. The format of this chapter intentionally
parallels the structure of Chapter II. Thus, mental
superimposition of the proposed modifications of corps fire
support over the existing structure will be simplified.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
The current corps staff organization closely follows the
original Corps headquarters which was patterned after
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General John J. Pershing's 1917 design of the General Staff
of the American Expeditionary Forces dtiring World War I
[Ref 12, p. 382j . Incredibly, there is little evidence of
any overall plans for review of the field version of the
Corps Headquarters, the CTOC, to substantiate its
organizational efficacy. This predicament can be largely
credited to two circumstances. The first, as stated in the
Department of the Army, Staff Officers Field Manual 101-5,
is that the "organization and mission of the command, as
well as the needs and the desires of the commander, will
determine the organization and operation of a TOC" ^Ref 4,
p. 8-3 J. Unforttinately , while some of the corps commanders
institute minor changes in staff working relationships or
emphasize particular areas, CTOC organizations are rarely
extensively or, more importantly, permanently changed. The
second condition existing is that staffs (G-1, G-2, G-3
,
G-4, FAS, etc.) at corps and division levels are primarily
constituted by personnel from distinct army branches that
logically parallel the fiinctions of these sections. While
this procedure makes perfect functional sense , it essen-
tially limits the scope of changes to staff sections to
branch-related perturbations. Table VI outlines this
dependency. Thus, if organizational changes in the CTOC
occur at all, they generally occur at the individual staff
section level. Similarly, improvements in the corps fire



























The magnitude of the ntimber of theoretical concepts
being developed is directly proportional to the number of
military services and major staff agencies involved. A
concerted effort named the Battlefield Development Plan
(BDP) intends to provide a logical basis for technological
developments in weaponry and C I systems £ Ref 13, p. 3QJ
.
The army organization behind this effort is the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, commonly referred to as
"TRADOC", The correctness of these concepts will not be
debated here. Indeed, it would be difficult to disprove





1. Army Tactical C I Architectural Concept
This concept serves as the architectural foundation
for the Army's development of an integrated and synergistic
3
C I system which will support their tactical forces. The
stated background and purpose for this concept are stated
below in Table VII \jief 14, p. I-lJ .
Table VII
3Army Tactical C I Concept
IPACKGROUNO
• RAPtOLY AOVANCiNQ TECHNOLOGY
• CONSTRAINED MONETARY RESOURCES/INFUTION
• FUNCTIONAL INTEROEPENOENCY
• SEGMENTED COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS
PROPONENCY
• CONSTRAINED MEDIA
• EFFECTIVE MARRIAGE OF HAROWARE/SOFTIWARC
• LOGISTICS SUPPORT
• COMBINED t JOINT OPERATIONS
PURPOSE:
• ESTABLISH SOUND ARCHITECTURAL GOAL
• OUTLINE REQUIRED FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES
FOR 1985 CI SYSTEM
• SHOW RELATIONSHIP OF CURRENT PROJECTS
TO OBJECTIVE SYSTEM
• DEFINE DEVELOPMENTAL STEPS AND PROCESSES
TO REACH OBJECTIVE SYSTEM
• IDENTIFY GAPS IN CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
EFFORTS
• ESTABLISH MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS TO
REACH ARCHITECTURAL GOALS
This dynamic concept is currently based on three key
principles as listed below:
1. The corps is the focal point.
^ • Key information needed will be identified and made
available to the commander .
3 . The System must be designed to support the commander
under all possible" conditions
.
3Three terms commonly utilized within the C I architecture
are real time, fusion of information and correlation of
information. Real time refers to processing data in a
situation with sxifficient speed to be able to make a
decision that will affect the outcome of that situation.
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Fusion is essentially defined as the bringing together and
comparison of information to provide the commander a clear
understanding of the battlefield. Correlation of
information is the comparison of two or more inputs from a
single information collector.
3The C I concept, if properly managed, has the
potential of significantly enhancing the combat capability
of U.S. forces, especially at Corps level. BETA, TOS,
ASAS, and TACFIRE are several of the ongoing developmental
3efforts which have resulted from the C I concept. These
projects, explained later in this chapter, serve as the
3basis for implementation of the C I strategy at corps level.
2 . Division '86
Division '86 is an ongoing, branch-coordinated study
headed by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. As the name implies, this effort primarily
concentrates on division level. The branch centers and
schools, as shown in Table X, are responsible for input
in their respective fields of expertise. Perturbations in
corps fire support have resulted from over-emphasis at
division level. In terms of field artillery fire support,
this has caused a shift in attention back to division level
which is akin to the orientation that occurred during the
development of the counterfire doctrine. Also, a concept
called target servicing has been added to the list of
responsibilities of the field artillery. Target Servicing
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indirect fire support on to enemy maneuver formations and
related targets in the main battle area. While battlefield
interdiction defined in Chapter II is still recognized,
it is not certain how effectively this can be done if the
preponderance of fire support assets are shifted to division
level
.
3 Air-Land Forces Interface (ALFI)
The ALFI concept was initiated in July 1976, as a
result of correspondence between the commanders of the
Army's TRADOC and the Air Force's TAG (Tactical Air
Command). The rationale was, and still is, that the
survivability of the U.S. close air support aircraft against
a modern enemy like the Warsaw Pact would be highly
dependent upon the suppression of the enemy air defense
(SEAD) capability. This suppression would be obtained by a
concerted effort to target enemy air defense and,
consequently, allocate firepower to suppress their effec-
tiveness. This firepower would include a portion of the
tactical air support, but primarily consist of indirect
fire support such as field artillery. The advantage of
utilizing indirect fire support assets is that they are
invulnerable to the air defense threat that is being
destroyed or neutralized. A SEAD effort is envisioned at
division and corps levels. However, the overall SEAD plan
would be developed and coordinated in the CTOC ^Ref 16j .
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Thus, an obvious effect on the corps fire support process
which SEAD will have will be to compete for fire support
resources, already at a premium.
4. Target-Rich Environment
The target-rich environment concept basically holds
that increases in target acquisition capabilities will
innundate the fire support system with viable targets.
This concept is more theoretical, than facttial , Neverthe-
less, it is the primary assumption along with the overall
desire to more efficiently manage friendly assets for
expansion into the automated data processing (ADP) field.
The view of the European battlefield seems to substantiate
this concept because of the high number of potential enemy
targets which comprise the Warsaw Pact forces. Neverthe-
less it must be realized that the mere existence of targets
does not automatically mean they can be effectively engaged
by existing fire support assets. Highly mobile targets,
for exajnple, are generally impervious to unobserved,
indirect fire weapons which are fired at the locations of
targets, detected at some prior point in time.
C. EXPECTED TECHNOLOGY-BASED DEVELOPMENTS
The rapid growth of technology in the last decade has
led to a proliferation of research and development in
weaponry and C^ I systems that has been difficult, if not
impossible, to coordinate. This condition has been coupled
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with tremendous economic constraints and a constantly-
changing perception of the nature of the futxire battlefield.
Hence, the absolute confidence that our nation is increasing
its national security is becoming more difficult to main-
tain. A small portion of the research and developmental
efforts has been directed at the army corps level.
Before proceeding to a description of these efforts,
there are two perspectives which should be clearly under-
stood concerning any expectations which might be inferred.
The first is that research and developmental products
should not be construed as synonymous with operational
capabilities . General Guthrie, DARCOM commander, has
emphasized that "sometimes the state-of-the-art is refined
to the extent that systems are obtained that work only in
the laboratory or are much too complex" FRef 2, p. 31J .
Secondly, under the planning, programming, budgeting system
(PPBS), Congress must annually appropriate the monetary
fxinding needed for the continuation of each of these efforts.
Indeed some, or all, of these efforts which are described
could be cancelled before the equipment is fully developed
and fielded.
This section will briefly outline these areas of
development, in terms of the input, processing and output
components of the corps fire support process, shown in
Figure 2. The input and processing categories primarily
consists of so-called "executive systems" which produce
usable information for the commander and his staff. The
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output category primarily contains the weapon systems which
will be used to attack enemy forces.
1 . Input Category
a. BETA
The development of the input mechanisms for the
fire support processors are being led by a joint-service,
Department of Defense-Directed, test-bed known as Project
BETA (Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition),
BETA is intended to minimize costs and schedule risks by
consolidating existing hardware and software information-
processing technology where possible, and by providing a
common means to test computerized correlation and display
of intelligence data. The primary objective is to use all
types of intelligence sensors, including national satellite
sensors, to permit direct targeting of enemy ground
targets. The impetus for BETA resulted partly from a study
conducted by the Surveys and Investigation Staff of the
Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives.
This study concluded that "existing Army Intelligence
systems were almost useless because they had inadequate
coverage, were not survivable , did not fuse all source data,
and were of inadequate accuracy to permit targeting by Army
weapons systems" ^Ref 15, p. 807j.
BETA, as has been stated, is a test bed. It is
therefore simply a means for experimentation to facilitate
development of the actual tactical systems that will be
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employed. BETA will be deployed to Europe in the fall of
1980 to be evaluated during the annual Reforger exercise.
BETA will continue to be developed into 1981. Its proved
functions will be incorporated into two other developmental
efforts called the All Soxirce Analysis System (ASAS) and
the Tactical Operations System (TOS),
b. ASAS
ASAS is a computerized system being developed
for corps and division levels which will result in accept-
ance, processing and analysis of both preprocessed and raw
information from an array of intelligence sources. As the
name ASAS might indicate, it will be utilized in the All
Source Analysis Centers (See Figure 1 and Table II) located
in the CTOC and the DTOC (Division Tactical Operations
Center). At corps level j intelligence sources include Army,
Joint, National and Allied systems. With current technolog-
ical constraints, the ASAS will consist of two separate
processors, one for collateral and one for special intel-
ligence data. Collateral (noncompartmented) intelligence
is essentially data obtained as a by-product of friendly
and enemy units which are engaged in the battle. Thus, the
probable source of the intelligence is, to some degree,
common knowledge to both sides. Special intelligence or
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is obtained from
highly classified sources. The knowledge of even their
very existence must be protected from the enemy. According
to current national security regulations, intelligence
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derived from these type sources must be sanitized
, that is
removal of any identification of source, before the data is
processed for either targeting purposes or general knowledge
of the enemy situation. The collateral processor will con-
trol the principal data base and interoperate with the TOS,
When it is technologically possible, the ASAS system will




Tactical Operations System (TOS) is a computer-
ized command and control system for corps (CTOS) and
division (DTOS) tactical operations centers. It is being
developed at the U.S. Army Combined Developments Activity
(CACDA) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Its purpose is to give
the tactical commander and his staff the means to evaluate
and process the massive amount of intelligence, operational
and logistical data expected from ADP technological advances,
Key in the TOS design will be the extensive use of inter-
active graphic display devices. These user-oriented,
devices hope to significantly improve real-time visualiza-
tion and evaluation of the tactical situation. The CTOS
will be electronically interfaced with lower, adjacent and
higher headquarters. Figure 3 [^Ref 17, p. B-f] depicts how
CTOS is presently envisioned.
Figure 3 is based on a CTOC organization which
has been proposed from the ALFI concept. Basically, the



























intelligence element, and an operations element. The BCC is
designed to contain the commander's equipment which will
allow him to monitor the situation. The heart of the TOS
will be the corps computer center (CCC) which will
constitute the major computational capability within the
corps. The CTOC will contain three terminal control units
(TCU) which will be powerful, but small minicomputers. The
TCU will provide the capability to receive, prompt, process,
transmit, retrieve, compose, edit, validate, store, display,
print, net monitor digital/voice messages, and interface
with the standard Army tactical communications systems.
Coupled to the TCU ' s are input-output devices (lOD) which
will have a color graphic display, hardcopy output, memory
capability and keyboard.
In the area of corps fire support, the Fires
section will utilize its lOD to extract target intelligence
from the CTOS for input into the Tactical Fire Direction
System (TACFIRE). Essentially, the Fires section will be
a derivation of the FAS organization, previously explained.
In addition, the fires section will be able to monitor the
current tactical situation displayed by CTOS and adjust fire
support assets accordingly,
2 . Processing Category
Since the mid-sixties, the U.S. Army and Litton
Industries have been developing a large-scale, computer-
based management information system called the Tactical Fire
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Direction System (TACFIRE). The purpose of this system is
to increase the effectiveness of the fire support of
maneuver forces. This can be accomplished by improving
field artillery command and control through a faster and
more efficient use of target intelligence, nuclear and
nonnuclear target analysis procedures, and the allocation
of fire support resources. Figure 4 depicts the basic






























Figure 4. Basic TACFIRE Methodology
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Essentially, TACFIRE intends to accomplish its
mission by providing automatic data-processing speed and
computerized digital communications to the field artillery
system in lieu of manual computations and voice communica-
tions. TACFIRE, through division level has been tested in
a field environment by the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery
at Fort Hood, Texas in 1978. Results of this operational
testing were favorable, and consequently, the U.S. Army has
made the decision to purchase additional TACFIRE equipment
to supply divisions worldv;-ide
.
TACFIRE is intended to employ fire support assets
in a hierarchical manner through maneuver company,
battalion, brigade, division and corps echelons of command.
The development of the TACFIRE interface at corps level is
currently ongoing. This development involves primarily
software design, since the TACFIRE equipment (hardware) at
corps level is identical in type, to the division artillery
equipment which is currently in production,
a . Hardware
The TACFIRE equipment is shown in Figure 5
[[Ref 18, p. B-2j and listed, by field artillery echelon, in
Table VIII QRef 18, p. B-s] . Essentially, TACFIRE repre-
sents third-generation computer technology. The majority
of the equipment is transported by equipment shelters
mounted on 5-ton trucks. Digital communications over
standard army communications equipment enable the computers






































TACFIRE Equipment at Field Artillery Levels
iQUIPVENT ;ORPS DIVISION P'JRPOSE
1. Arrillery Control Console (ACC) 1
2. Electronic Line Printer (EL?) 2
3. Digital Plotter Map (DPM)
4. Electronic Tactical Display (ETD)l
5. Central Processing Unit (CPU) 1
S. Input/Output Unit (lOU)
7. NIass Core Memory Units (MCMU) 4
3. Auxiliary Removable Media 2
Memory (AKMI.I) - magnetic tape
9. Digital Data Terminal (DDT) 7
10. Communication Control Unit(CCU) 1
11. Communication Security System 1
Interfaces operator with
the computer .'.Vill control
all processing, data entry,
and data retrieval.
Provides a printout of each
transaction.
Draws fire support coordin-
ation measures and target
data on naps or overlays.
Shows (on a cathode ray tube)
fire support coordination
measures and target data.
Performs all data process-
ing to generate solutions
to FA problems.
Controls data transfer
between the compurer '
s
CPU, memories, and all other
components
.
Stores data and programs
for use by the CPU.
Enables loadi.ig of pro-
grams into the computer's
memories and storage of
dynamic data.




Enables the encryption and
decryption of digital mes-
messages
.
12. Variable Format Message
Entry Device (VFMED)
13. S-230 Equipment Shelter
An interactive computer
terminal to be located in
the FAS and Division FSE,
Houses the TACFIRE computer
center hardware.
NOTE: TACFIRE equipment will also be found at the Field Artillery
battalion level (not included above). All echelons will be




The Amended Statement of V/ork £^Ref 19] is the
current (July 1979) basis for the software being developed
for the TACFIRE hardware found at the Corps FAS. As stated
in that docioment, the impetus behind the basic concept of
design (BCD) is, "... to arrive at a common configuration,
both software and hardware, that will support Division
Artillery FA Brigade, and Corps FAS operations. The largest
life-cycle-cost benefit from such an approach is the
tremendous reduction in software maintenance and operator/
maintenance personnel training" ^Ref 19, p. 17J . Basic-
ally, this software is designed to consider, as desired,
nuclear and nonnuclear munitions from all field artillery,
naval giinfire, air and missile weapon systems available in
the corps zone of fire. By using preprogrammed, determin-
istic effectiveness computations, TACFIRE will recommend the
"best" weapon system available and compute the amount of
munitions required to achieve a specified effectiveness
level. Through the hardware interactive terminals, TACFIRE
will accept user modifications to this criteria. In
addition, TACFIRE will store and evaluate fire support
coordination measures in the processing of target informa-
tion. As figures 5 and Table VIII indicate, TACFIRE hard-
ware is capable of displaying information in many forms.
Current target lists, fire plans, unit status reports and
ammunition status reports are continuously updated for "real




Technological innovations characterize the proposed
changes in corps fire support weapon systems. Typically,
these innovations attempt to counter the rapidly moving
armored vehicle, European- type threat via increases in
weapon system effectiveness . Table IX summarizes these
developments at corps level into three categories : cannon
artillery ratinitions, the General Rocket System (GSRS) and
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rV. THE CORPS FIRE SUPPORT ENIGMA
The corps fire support process, as evident from the
preceding chapters, is enormously intricate. It clearly is
3
a very complex system. As technological advances in C I
systems and weaponry evolve, corps fire support also becomes
increasingly complicated. A complete understanding of all
parameters affecting corps fire support is essential to a
viable design, development, and operation of the corps fire
support system. However, before these parameters can be
accurately identified to system developers, they must first
be fully understood by the personnel in the CTOC, The
extent to which these parameters are not understood or
unknown is indicative of the magnitude of the corps fire
support enigma. An enigma, or problem, may be defined as
"a blocked managerial goal" [^Ref 21, p. 28j , In the corps
fire support process, the problem exists as how to maximize
the effects of all fire support assets available to the
corps in support of the specified mission.
A nximber of factors exist which impede the attainment of
a viable corps fire support system. These factors will be
described from three vantage points or perspectives. These
perspectives provide a framework within which the complexity
of the corps fire support process may be understood. They
represent a continuum of existing deficiencies and not
separate, distinct problem categories. This chapter will
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view these factors contributing to the problem from
systemic, organizational and operational perspectives.
Chapter V will then provide possible measures to eliminate
some of these factors in order that effective corps fire
support may be obtained.
A. SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE
4
The systemic view concentrates on the organizations
which are external to the corps headquarters and the CTOC
configuration. Stated differently, these are specific
factors caused by procedures and organizations above, and
below, corps level which manifest themselves as obstructions
to the development of effective corps fire support. These
factors have been categorized into the four areas of
discontinuity, situational xincertainty , relational conflict,
and nonproductivity.
1 . Discontinuity
Three distinct types of discontinuity have been
identified by a recent study done for the Secretary of
Defense by the Rice Committee {^Ref 22] . The first type is
discontinuity between the developing contractor, or agency,
and the ultimate user. In corps fire support development,
the major participants involved are DARCOM commands, TRADOC
centers. Army branch centers and schools, civilian contract-
ors and the corps headquarters (user) . Table X lists some
of these participants involved with their primary
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geographical locations. Although it is recognized that
some of these participants establish field offices, or
make periodic liaison visits, the fact remains that
geographical dispersion creates intolerable coordination
and communication problems. This has manifested itself in
repeated instances where initially defined mission require-
ments and system design proposals radically change during
the research, development and acquisition process. The
final version of the system often falls short of operational
expectations. Typically, this form of discontinuity is
evidenced by cost overruns, delayed production schedules,
and crisis-to-crisis management.
The second type of discontinuity "concerns the
difficulties of simultaneously developing several major
subsystems and integrating them into a weapon system"
LRef 22, p. 32J. This problem is patently applicable to the
development of CI systems. \\/hen viewed as a broad spectrum
of interrelated systems and subsystems, multiple technolog-
ical applications create a formidable problem. Simply
stated, there is no such thing as a corps fire-decision
support system program; there is a series of projects
concerned with corps fire support.
The last form of discontinuity results from personal
or corporate objectives which conflict with a coherent,
streamlined, acquisition or design effort. A program
manager, for example, may seek short-term results which are
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to the overall developmental efforts. Likewise, corporate-
type entities including commercial developers and defense
agencies may be driven by profit or power motives. These
types of objectives, xvhile acceptable in the democratic
framework of free enterprise, can be an encumbrance in the
quest for military preparedness.
2 . Situational Uncertainty
The army's primary objective is to "win the land
battle" fRef 23, p. 1-lJ . IVhile this generalized statement
is applicable to all army echelons, it does not provide any
insight into the various factors which decrease combat
effectiveness due to constantly changing situational
factors. As explained in Chapter II, corps organizations
have geographical, structural, and physical equipment
differences. Consequently, each corps organization has
certain nuances which result in a significantly different
set of situational requirements. In modern system develop-
ment and design procedures, some of these differences are
recognized and compensated. Yet, there are some differences
which are not compensated due to three distinct reasons.
The first, and most obvious, reason is that all nuances are
not known or clearly understood by the developing agency.
Secondly, those that are defined at one point in time, may
be dependent upon a specific scenario, capability or tactic
which is altered without subsequent altering of the require-
ment. The third possibility is that the requirement may be
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known and tinderstood, but not compensated because of major
changes in equipment design which v/ould result or an
assumption that the user organization can resolve the
inadequacy. These inadequacies generally are recognized
by the user organizations only after the systems are fielded
and used in several tactical field exercises. Then these
deficiencies often result in the generation of additional
requirements which demand that the research, development and
acquisition process to continue, ad nauseam.
3 . Relational Conflict
One fundaimental principle commonly associated with
a military organization is chain of command. This principle
is based on a hierarchical relationship between senior and
subordinate commanders. In the allocation of corps fire
support means, a conflict often arises between the corps
and division commanders. V/hile the corps commander is
organizationally senior to his division commanders, there
exists at division and below levels, a strong belief that
artillery assets available at corps should be attached to
subordinate echelons. As written in an article shortly
after World V7ar II, "this is a natural and very human
position, but one which is not soundly based*' [[^Ref 24,
p. lOlJ. The initial surge of the counterfire concept added
temporary support to the rationale to control artillery
firepower below corps level. As has been indicated, this
rationale has been partially weakened within recent years
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with the advent of Battlefield Interdiction. The danger
that exists is that the relational conflict will obstruct or
delay the shifting of corps fire support from the control
of the divisions back to corps control in the post D+4
period, A means to resolve this relational conflict must
be found,
4. Nonproductivity
In 1964, the House of Representatives' Military
Operations Subcommittee criticized the Department of
Defense's research and development philosophy as exhibiting
"overmanagement and tmderperformance" (^Ref 25, p. isj.
Although it is true that the services have complex systems
with subtle problems, current evidence still indicates that
this criticism is valid Qlef 2, p. 31j . Underperformance
that can be correctly attributed to fiscal constraints may
be somewhat justified. Underperformance due to inefficien-
cies, however, cannot be defended. The institution of the
Planning, Prograinming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in recent
years has attempted to rectify these types of deficiencies.
Additionally, Congress has taken a much more active role in
controlling the budgetary process as evidenced by the 1974
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act ^Ref 26,
p. 8lJ. Ironically, it may even be asserted that PPBS and
added congressional involvement has increased overmanage-
ment or overcontrol of the research, development and
acquisition process. Despite the validity of the original
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rationale used to establish these mechanisms, the fact
remains that corps fire support operational capabilities




The corps headquarters organization and its CTOC
configuration have certain intrinsic factors which impede
the attainment of effective corps fire support. X'H-iile some
of the same characteristics are found at lower echelons, the
ability at corps level to actively and expeditiously resolve
resulting problems is less robust. This section identifies
these factors as basic generic characteristics and as
specific functional obstructions. The perspective ut:ilized
in this analysis equates to a view of the CTOC organization
from top (Commander or Chief of Staff) and mid-level (Staff
Section heads) managerial positions,
1 . Generic Characteristics
a. Garrison versus Field Conditions
U.S. active-army units fluctuate between two,
distinctively different, environmental settings. The
majority of the time is spent in a garrison setting with
emphasis on maintenance of equipment, classroom training
and administrative duties. Corps headquarters are generally
maintained close to one hiindred percent of the authorized
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ntimber of personnel. Despite this apparent indicator of
well-being, it is not uncommon for headqioarters to operate,
during garrison conditions, under fouj?teen-hour workdays.
Garrison operations revolve around fixed, corporate-type,
organizational relationships and non-combat functions.
Thus, the fire support process as found in the CTOC is not
exercised in the garrison setting.
During field exercises, the corps headquarters
deploys in the CTOC configuration. Although it varies with
each corps, it is an infrequent occurrence. Over the span
of a year, corps headquarters deploy only three or four
times for seven to ten day exercises. The effectiveness of
these exercises as a training device depends upon the extent
to which subordinate and adjacent headquarters are
concurrently deployed during the exercises and the magnitude
of the functional obstructions, which will be described
later. This observation particularly holds true for the
fire support process. Rarely, if ever, are all elements of
the fire support system exercised jointly. Consequently,
the readiness of major army headquarters to be immediately
engaged in an intense combat environment is questionable.
In fairness to army leaders, fiscal and time
scheduling constraints limit the number of field exercises
that can be conducted. Nevertheless, there is not a
constant refinement of the fire support process. Nev/
technological advances are merely superimposed on an,
already, insufficient situation. Additionally, field
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exercises do not fully simulate the reality of combat.
Limited time in the field and the need to return to take
care of garrison responsibilities causes field experience
to be treated, in general, as a necessary evil as opposed
to a critically needed expertise,
b. Proximity to Battle
In Management in the Armed Forces , written by
British author J.C.T, Downey, the basic nature of an army
is contrasted with the navy and air force services.
Essentially, Downey maintains that the army is "an organiza-
tion which must come to close quarters with its enemy and
engage in fighting with plenty of short, sharp jabs to the
body," while the navy and air force are not engaged with
the enemy as whole organizations [^Ref 27, p. 78j. As a
general statement concerning division level and below, this
perception is valid. It is invalid to extend this belief
automatically to corps level, however. In v/ars with a
relatively established Forward Edge of the Battle Area
(FEBA) such as that envisioned in the European scenario,
there is a physical basis for this rationale. Proximity of
headquarters and tactical units to enemy forces increases
their active engagement and the probability of receiving
enemy fires. From company through division level, the
inversely proportional relationship between distance from
the enemy and intensity of involvement is relatively
constant. Between division and corps level, however, the
intensity of involvement is drastically decreased. This
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disproportionally is primarily caused by the limited ability
of the enemy's fire support systems to effectively engage
targets at long ranges. Figure 6 graphically depicts the
spatial relationship of corps (XXX) and division (XX)
tactical operation centers (shown by the headquarters




CORPS REAR BOUN ARY
Figure 6. Situation Overlay
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2 . Functional Obstructions
Factors v/hich result in a degradation of the fire
support process can be considered as functional obstruc-
tions. Typically, these obstructions clearly violate one,
or more, of the fire support coordination principles listed
in Table IV. They are parochial to the corps tactical
operation center environment. A listing of these factors
will not be located in existing army field manuals or corps
standing operating procedure (SOP).
Technological innovations, by themselves, are
unlikely to eliminate these subtle barriers to organiza-
tional efficiency. Their design, development, and
implementation will be fruitless if the organizational
frajnev/ork in which they will be employed is ineffectual.
Table XI lists the factors pertinent to the corps
fire support process. With each factor is a brief
description and explanation of its effect.
C. OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Hannibal (274 B.C. - 182 B.C.) has been credited with
stating, "Regardless of its mechanisms, war remains a
matter of human beings, directed hy their minds" l_Ref 27,
p. 97J. This statement appears to be basically valid,
even today in the light of modern technology. For this
reason, the corps fire support pi?ocess must be also




Functional Obstructions to Corps Fire Support
Lack of Common Knov/ledge ; The fire support process is
so complex that it is difficult for all staff sections
and their personnel to fully understand all the
parameters. While the FAS personnel are in the best
position to xjnderstand the process, they cannot compen-
sate for failures in other sections.
Lack of a Common Sense of Urgency ; A responsive fire
support process requires a deep appreciation of the
element of time. The accomplishment of long-range plan-
ning must be tempered by the reality of current opera-
tions, A sense of urgency is a relative concept which
must be evenly distributed throughout the CTOC.
Section Autonomy ; This factor might be equally called-
tinshared goals. Despite the logic of unity of purpose,
the impetus for staff sections to v/ork towards the
common goal of a viable fire support system is conspic-
uously absent in peacetime. This holds particularly
for garrison configurations but extends over into the
limited number of field exercises.
Branch/Section Mystique ; As Table VI depicts, staff
sections are composed of soldiers with particular branch
backgrounds. During current operations, staff sections
may fail to interface properly with other sections due
to a basic lack of understanding of the requirements or
their capabilities.
Environmental Inconsistency : CTOCs are physically con-
structed according to the ti'pes of equipment and staff
sections authorized and present. The necessity to move
this complex according to the tactical situation poses
different problems every time it is done. Communica-
tions equipment, map boards, charts, work areas and the
spatial arrangement of the staff sections can, and do,
change and can affect the efficiency of the fire
support process. To the fullest extent possible, each
CTOC has SOPs designed to lessen the turmoil. Neverthe-
less, the fire support process cannot enjoy the full
luxury of being neatly organized in the same, time-
independent, manner as a corporate assembly line.
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perspective. This perspective has been divided into three
major causes of personal frustration. These causes are an
inadequate level of personal knowledge, lack of battlefield
damage assessment, and the inability to effect corrective
action.
1 • Inadequate Level of Personal Knowledge
The average corps staff officer it intelligent,
highly motivated and fiercely dedicated. Yet, this
admirable array of qualities does not, magically, endow the
staff officer with the body of knowledge needed to optimize
corps fire support. Two primary factors contribute to the
insufficiency of personal knowledge, the first of which is
limited exposure to corps level operations.
a. Limited Exposure to Corps
As might be inferred from the relatively few
existing corps headquarters, the number of personnel having
the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of the corps
fire support process is extremely limited. Current
personnel assignment procedures reduce even further the on-
the-job training experience. An army officer assigned to a
corps headquarters remains in that assignment, typically,
twelve to eighteen months. During that time period, the
officer might possibly participate in four to six field
exercises. The complexities of the corps fire support
process cannot be adequately digested in this small number
of sporadic experiences. Thus, personnel become frustrated
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by the awareness that they are unable to develop a suffi-
cient level of expertise in the field environment.
Additionally, each field exercise seems to be substantially
different from the one before it so that a c-umulative
learning process does not occur.
b. Insufficient Experience
The second factor which contributes to personnel
having inadequate knowledge of the fire support process is a
function of their previous experience. As has been
indicated previously, the FAS is the focal point for the
fire support process. Since it is here that the selection
of the best available fire support means is performed, it
would be reasonable to expect that the personnel making the
decision have complete knowledge of the critical parameters
of each weapon system. This is not always the case,
however. While the FAS is made of field artillery officers,
even their knowledge of all. field artillery systems may be
incomplete. The reason for this is similar to the limited
opportunity to obtain corps-level experience. Within the
normal job assignment pattern of a field artillery officer,
it is not likely that he will have total familiarity with
all types of weapon systems. For this reason it is entirely
possible that no one in the FAS will be fully cognizant of
the specific capabilities and limitations of the Lance
missile system. While certain parameters such as maximum
range are easy to comprehend and apply, other parameters
such as firing response times and weapon effects are more
70

difficult to conceptualize and to apply in a decision making
environment. To extend this problem further, the other
members of the CTOC are prone to even greater errors of
mistmderstanding concerning the capabilities of corps fire
support weapons. An actual example of the extent to which
these errors can impede the corps fire support process
occurred during a recent field exercise. At that time, a
senior officer in the CTOC insisted that Lance missiles be
fired at a moving enemy tank platoon, located by intel-
ligence sources over an hour before the target data was
passed to the FAS. In this example, the selection of an
indirect-fire, long-range, weapon system for a moving target
is inappropriate. The age of the intelligence data, coupled
with the response time of the weapon system, eliminates
virtually all chance of success.
2 . Lack of Battlefield Damage Assessment
Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA) is the appraisal
of the damage inflicted on enemy targets after a friendly
weapon system has been utilized. With indirect-fire
artillery weapons firing at long ranges, there is usually
little information that can be gained concerning what target
damage, if any, was achieved. Yet, it is this immediate
feedback which is vital to the continuous effort to insure
that fire support assets are being effectively allocated.
If air assets are utilized to attack tsirgets, it is possible
that some BDA will be obtained via photographic means or a
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pilot's visual sighting. In a high air defense threat
environment like Exirope
, it is unlikely that even this is
available. Lack of BDA is therefore another source of
personal frustration, since the FAS members are xinable to
fully determine the effectiveness of their decisions.
3. Inability to Effect Corrective Action
The sporadic natxire of field exercises and high
personnel turbulence in the staff sections result in a
sitiaation which causes the third type of frustration. That
frustration is a feeling of helplessness due to the inabil-
ity to effect lasting and significant changes in the CTOC
organization, relative to the corps fire support process.
Corps staff sections in the field typically operate
continuously (24 hours per day) in two, twelve-hoxir shifts.
During the conduct of field exercises, the CTOC operates in
hurried response to a predetermined exercise scenario. This
hectic environment usually leaves little opportunity for
concurrent and innovative reorganization of the CTOC, or
refinement of established procedures. After the field
exercise ends, the return to garrison conditions is usually
immediate. As was previously discussed, the garrison
environment is not conducive to improvement of the corps
fire support process. As a direct result, the CTOC does not
mature as an organization. Corrective actions are rarely
implemented, and those that are implemented are usually only
temporarily effective. Again, personnel turbulence contrib-
utes to the existence of this unsatisfactory condition.
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V. SOLVING THE CORPS FIRE SUPPORT ENIGMA
Why Ideas are Killed ; Man is so constituted as to see
what is wrong with a new thing ... not what is right.
To verify this, you have but to submit a new idea to
a committee. They will obliterate ninety per cent of
rightness for the sake of ten per cent of wrongness.
The possibilities that a new idea opens up are not




Increasing the effectiveness of the corps fire support
process asstimes that there is both room for improvements and
a valid need to make those improvements. From the previous
chapters, the basis for believing that each of these
conditions exist should be firmly established. Several
aspects of this basis were the reality of the Soviet threat,
the linsuccessful evolution of technological advances, the
fluctuating parameters of the CTOC environment and the
conflicting interrelationships in the fire support process.
It is not intended that the corps fire support process be
singled out because it is the only portion of army
operations that could be improved. Certainly, there are
numerous enhancement possibilities in any large-scale,
dynamic organization. Corps fire support is, hov/ever, the
critical process in corps operations. War, in its most
simple form, is a matter of locating your enemy and
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destroying his forces. Effective fire support encompasses
the full spectrum of these actions.
Proposed solutions or improvements to corps fire support
are offered in this chapter. It should be understood that
these solutions have been developed without undue concern
for political, geographical or bureaucratic constraints
which might be asserted as prohibiting their adoption. To
do so otherwise would be to limit the imagination and, thus,
be guilty of Charles Kettering's premise. Additionally, it
is not expected that these proposed solutions will be
universally accepted. Dr. Henry Kissinger has stated that,
"Decision making can grow so complex that the process of
producing a bureaucratic consensus may overshadow the
purpose of the effort" ^Ref 28, p. 19j . It can only be hoped
that the U.S. civilian and military bureaucratic structure
can focus on the national defense effort , before the Soviet
threat becomes a reality.
A. TOTAL SYSTEMS APPROACH
The proliferation of automatic data processing (ADP)
technology in the last two decades has led to widespread
attempts to integrate these advances into existing
organizational structures. The extent of success of these
3
endeavors in the commercial sector, as well as military C I
applications, has been much less than expected. This
condition has precipitated a deluge of research in the field
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of management science such as management information system
theory, general systems theory, organizational theory and
contingency theory [Ref 29, p.vj. Theories, being
speculative by nature, will not provide exacting steps by
which the link between ADP technology and organizational
results can be forged. Theories are useful, however, in
providing insight and provoking debate in the problem area.
Yet, continual theorizing without perceptible results is
merely academic exercise. In the corps fire support enigma,
what are needed are concrete and viable results. It is
clear that, results cannot be obtained without some explicit
modus operandi. One method that can be utilized is a
total systems approach,
A total systems approach, proposed in 1968 by Young,
asserted that, "organizations should be designed around
the technology; technology should not be forced to fit an
existing structure" j^Ref 30, p. 49^. Since 1968, however,
the pace of technological research has disproportionately
outdistanced its tangible applications. Consequently, a
lengthy defense resource acquisition process can result in
fielding equipment measurably behind the state-of-the-art.
TACFIRE, for example, has already been cited as being based
on technology that is ten to fifteen years old. One major
reason for this type occurrence is that design specifica-
tions, once declared in procurement contracts, become legal
and fiscal constraints. As a result, the equipment
purchased by defense outlays tends to be based on past
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technology, rather than current technology. The lengthy
procurement process often counteracts efforts to take
advantage of new technology, needed in the defense
establishment
.
In consideration of these factors, it is clear that
organizations cannot be designed around technology.
Conversely, technology cannot be designed around the
organization. The reason for this is that the parameters
of the CTOC organization are extremely ntimerous and
constantly changing. In a similar situation in the civilian
sector, noted by Orkins and Weiss, it was concluded that,
"... it is not possible to achieve permanent problem
definition, and, as a result, there can be no permanent
solution" I^Ref 31, p. 419]. V/hat , then, is the solution?
The solution, it would seem, must be a total systems
approach that recognizes constant technological and
organizational changes as being typical, not atypical, of a
complex organization such as the CTOC . These two types of
changes are clearly not dependent on one another. Thus,
the importance of conscientiously, and explicitly, defining
their roles in the enhancement efforts of the corps fire
support process is revealed. Additionally, the dimension
of time must be considered in the determination of the
alternative improvements selected for implementation. One
final aspect that must be addressed in this approach is the
delineation of its scope.
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The scope, or area encompassed, of Young's total system
approach equated to the organization being considered.
Chapter IV was intentionally divided into systemic,
organizational and operational parts to aid in the defini-
tion of scope. It should be clear that the CTOC, although
defined as an organization, is not the "organization" in
the context of the total system approach. The total
systems approach must be applied to an area surrounding all
three parts to effectively resolve the corps fire support




ORGANIZATIONAL REGION / OPERATIONAL REGION
Figure 7. The Total Systems Approach
Supportive of the total systems approach has been the
April, 1979, establishment of the Army Force Modernization
Coordination Office (AFMCO) in the Office of the Chief of
Staff, Army. As its name implies, AFMCO is the staff focal
point for coordinating changes in the realm of force
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modernization. Its inception is both timely and signifi-
cant. According to the current Chief of AFMCO, Major-
General Richard D. La;vrence , its missions include the
following:
1. Monitor all material systems under development
and identify those requiring more intensive
management.
2. Identify and assess collective problems of force
modernization, manage by exception, recommend
solutions
.
3. Ensure that major commands receive timely data
through channels to support fielding,
4. Review plans ^ studies and actions which involve
force modernization and fielding.
5. Identify fielding problems, integrate and coordinate
and assume problem resolution.
6. Task Army staff and major commands as required.
7. Maintain fielding overview of selected material.
(Ref 32, p. 26}
As might be conjectured, the extent to which these missions
are fulfilled will indicate the overall success of AFMCO.
Since AFMCO is a coordinating office, not an operating
agency, its staff is extremely small. Having only ten,
field-grade officers and three civilian administrators
besides the chief, AFMCO has limited capability to resolve
the wide range of problems indicated in Chapter IV. Yet, it
is these types of problems which could effectively obstruct
the attainment of AFMCO 's missions. In apparent recognition
of this limitation, Major-General Lawrence has indicated
that, "during the formative period of AFMCO organization,
attention will be paid to the type and momber of aids to
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responsive, incisive management decisions on modernization"
CRef 32, p. 28] . Nevertheless, AFMCO's cognizance of the
general nature of the aids needed will, probably, not result
in detailed dissolution of the corps fire support enigma.
B. THE FIRE-DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
TsOcing a total systems approach to the solution of the
corps fire support enigma establishes the needed framework
within which to work, but fails to specify what, exactly,
is being sought. To aid in this endeavor, the concept of
decision support systems should be applied to the corps
fire support process.
The concept of decision support systems (DSS) has
evolved in the commercial sector during the last five to
ten years. Basically, DSS supports manager decision making
by utilizing ADP technology to perform sensitivity analysis
of the decision parameters. It has been a logical outgrowth
of the management information systems (MIS). While a MIS
also utilizes ADP technology, its final product tends to be
modest in comparison with the goals of a DSS, MIS, in
general, provides the manager with pertinent information
displayed to ease the task of decision making. Its focus
is therefore limited in the sense that its output is
actually a basic input to the manager. The DSS approach
focuses on the important decisions of the organization
concerned. Thus, its scope includes that of a MIS and the
managerial decision making process,
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The corps fire support process is, in every respect, a
perfect candidate for a DSS approach. According to McCosh
and Scott Morton, [^Ref 33, p, 39] there are, at least seven
criteria which can be applied to determine if a particular
problem area is suitable for a DSS. These criteria are
listed below in Table XII.
Table XII
Criteria for Applicability of a Decision Support System
1. The problem must be of central importance to a
manager. It must be a key decision.
2. Large data base present.
3. High volume of data manipulation.
4. Analysis can be performed in discrete stages.
5. Large aimount of judgemental decision-making.
6. Complex interrelationships.
7. Numerous communication interfaces required between
sub-elements of the system.
One criteria which could be added to Table XII which is
applicable to the corps fire support process, but often
ignored, is a critical need for a timely decision. Indeed,
a military-oriented DSS may be many times more sensitive to
this criteria that a commercial-oriented DSS due to the
fleeting nature of targets and, the life and death
consequences of the mismanagement of combat resources.
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Thus, the goal for the total systems approach ought to
be the attainment of a viable fire-decision support system
(FDSS). It must span the entire corps fire support, shown
in Figtire 2. The FAS, since it is the focal point, should
monitor the FDSS and adjust its decision making criteria as
the combat situation changes. The remaining portion of this
chapter proposes possible solutions to the corps fire
support enigma. Its format is similar to Chapter IV, again
to facilitate the mental superimposition of material. The
suggestions are referred to as "solution spaces" to maintain
a mental frame of reference. However, they should be
considered segments of a continuum of solutions, not dis-
crete answers. The desired goals cannot be achieved by a
piecemeal approach. Synergistic effects of the solutions
must be gained where possible. The fire-decision support
system can be explained only as a totality, not as an
arithmetic sum of parts.
C. SYSTEMIC SOLUTION SPACE
The systemic perspective in Chapter IV explained some
of the factors, external to the CTOC, which inhibit the
advancement of the corps fire support process. From these
factors, it may logically be deduced that the development
of the CTOC is partially dependent on the productivity and
cooperation of the associated, external actors. As might
be surmised, a corps commander has limited influence on
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these actors. Therefore, corps commanders, understandably,
hesitate to expend their constrained time and limited
resources in attempting to influence equipment and system
developments. This occurs especially if their efforts
appear unlikely to increase corps capabilities during their
tenure. The natural tendency is to concentrate only on
problems that can be solved in the immediate future . Thus
,
long-range plans and solutions for the corps are relatively
low in priority. Conveniently, the belief that a corps
commander need not become involved with research, develop-
ment and acquisition, because organizations such as DARCOM
have the responsibility for this effort, seems to be widely
held. The question is whether or not this approach is a
satisfactory one. A momentary digression may serve to
illuminate the issue.
It is often correctly asserted that the 1973 Middle
East War demonstrated the importance of combined arms
operations in the determination of success on the battle-
field. U.S. Army doctrine also emphasizes that maximum
combat effectiveness can only be obtained through combined
arms teamwork [kef 23, p. 3-lc] . Indeed, the preponderance
of the Soviet ground forces are organized into Combined
Arms Armies (CAA) C^^f 34, p. J. Yet, the combined arms
concept is not new. One of Napolean's maxims of war was,
"Infantry, cavalry, and artillery can not do without one
another ..." C^^ef 35, p. 69j . The, seemingly, universal
and timeless acceptance of this concept is truely amazing.
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It has been stated that combined arms has led to "the
fastest, most effective execution of the mission" ^Ref 23,
p. 3-loJ . The basis for this reasoning appears to be that
combined arms represent a finely-tuned balance between
complementarity and co-ordination. The payoff is enhanced
combat power via the synergistic effects of the component
systems. Can this battle-proven approach be, in some way,
incorporated in the development of a fire decision support
system? It is believed that it can!
1 . Increasing Corps Involvement
If the total systems approach definition of
"organization" is utilized, there can be little doubt about
the general course of action needed. According to William
T. Morris, the basic problems of organizational design are
"how to divide the work of the organization among its
members and of how to co-ordinate the activities of the
members" [kef 36, p. 25J . The resolution of these problems
lies, according to Morris, somewhere between the two
extremes of decentralization and centralization LRef 36,
p. llX
It seems prudent to shift a greater portion of the
research and developmental effort to corps organizations.
The CTOC and the expertise level of the personnel that are
assigned to it comprise the essential elements of the
"battleground" on which many of the C I systems will be
fielded. As depicted in Table X, geographical dispersion
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of the developing agencies and civilian corporations, alone,
pose a major problem. As long as the current array of
discrepancies exist a national objective of military
preparedness, sufficient to meet the communist threat,
cannot be attained.
The functional and equipmental dissimilarities
between the various types of U.S. corps headquarters indi-
cate that this shift in resources will not be sufficient if
it is only performed on one testbed location. The current
goal of research, development and acquisition methods is
to increase overall efficiency by avoiding duplication of
efforts, where possible. What is possible, however, must
be a question answered by a meticulous and continuous
comparison of the real variants in the CTOC organizational
environment. One way in which to achieve the level of
understanding and coordination needed would be to establish
a single "contact team" that could circulate among the five
corps headquarters to keep all corps organizations informed
of the efforts of the others. To avoid conflicts with the
command authority hierarchy, it would have an advisory role
as opposed to a directory role.
Increasing corps involvement is supported by the
same rationale used to increase user involvement in the
design of management information systems. The advantages
of this design approach, as reported by Lucas ^Ref 37,
p. 83J, are the following:




2. "The user will understand the system and
become trained in it more easily."
3. "The user knows what is needed for the'
application, and, since the user is in
control, quality will be defined according
to user criteria,"
4. "The user interface with the system will be
appropriate because the user will have
designed it."
It is highly probable that increased corps involve-
ment would, initially, be disfavored by corps commanders.
The simple reason for this fact is that they are not staffed
to cope with this additional mission. One possible solution
to this deficiency would be to augment the corps head-
quarters with a special staff section working directly under
the corps Chief of Staff. The placement of this section
tinder the Chief of Staff is in concert with his responsibil-
ities and, therefore, would be functionally correct.
2 . Evolutionary Development
The process by which the organizational equipment
and system changes are made, in general, should be
evolutionary instead of revolutionary in nature. The
decision as to what is considered evolutionary and vjhat is
revolutionary must be made at corps level. Evolutionary
changes can be thought of as incremental improvements over
time. General (USA, Retired) Bruce C. Clarke, who
Eisenhower called the greatest trainer of soldiers since
Washington's General Von Steuben at Valley Forge, describes
this as the "little pluses" method. According to Clarke,
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the most effective way to improve a military organization
is to "improve gradually every facet of the organization
over a period of time ... " £Ref 38, p. lllj .
It is recognized that economy of scale solutions in
RDT & S processes can result in monetary savings. Yet,
this benefit is often more apparent, than real. Again, the
decision on when they should be applied must be part of a
conscious effort at corps level to attain visible improve-
ments in the corps fire support process. Cost benefits




Relational conflicts, such as those existing between
corps and division levels, were cited in Chapter IV.
Doctrinal or managerial conflicts must be identified during
training exercises and commander conferences. Explicit
clarification of these issues must be made, recorded and
followed. These conflict resolutions, whenever possible,
have to be made before actual combat is required.
4. Committed Flexibility
The problems of overmanagement and overcontrol must
be conquered by a demonstrated desire to permit the fiscal
and operational freedoms needed to accomplish stated
objectives. \Vhile some constraints are necessary, the
controlling mechanism utilized must not be responsible for
the failure to attain that which you are trying to achieve.
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Committed flexibility may be facilitated, in part, by the
evolutionary method since short-range objectives produce
discernible results which are easier to fiscally and
rationally justify.
D. ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTION SPACE
Organizational improvements must be obtained through
innovative management at corps level. By utilizing the
"little pluses" approach, even generic problems may be
solved. Time, fiscal and resource constraints will continue
to create a sitxaation which has been called a "hostile
training environment" L^^ef 39, p. 16j . The key to solving
this situation is to recognize that the first goal of the
army has been specified, by law, in Title 10 of the U.S.
code. Its mission is the "... preparation of land forces
for the effective prosecution of war . . . and organizing,
training and equipping for prompt and sustained combat"
[jRef 37, p. isj . Any obstructions to achieving this goal
must be eliminated if the maintenance of an Army is to have
any meaning at all. There can be no excuses or reasons for
failure . As once asserted by General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, There can "... be no substitute for victory!"




1. Maintain Field Orientation
The garrison versus field conflict may be eased by
altering the garrison environment to parallel working
relationships that are normally found in the CTOC. This
does not mean that the CTOC physical configuration need,
necessarily, be constructed identically in garrison. It
does mean that every possible similarity in an operational
context should be duplicated, if feasible. It is true that
garrison duties do not correspond to those performed during
a, scenario-driven, field exercise. VThat can be done,
however, is that the percentage of personnel involved in
garrison duties can be deliberately forced to a low level.
The remaining portion of the personnel must be given the
mission, and the time, to resolve field (CTOC) problems.
To avoid the tendency to specialize the personnel in the
garrison area, periodic rotation of the personnel must be
enforced to insure the field expertise is spread throughout
the organization,
2 . Observe Subordinate Units
Understanding the capabilities of subordinate units
means knowing their proficiency and their limitations. The
best way to accomplish this is by establishing informal
observational visits during their field exercises. This
program would also involve division-level staff counterparts
establishing liaison visits to the corps staff. To the
full3st extent possible, all officer and senior enlisted
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men on the corps staff should be involved on a rotational
basis. Admittedly, this type of training would be time-
consioming and, possibly, expensive. The professional
knowledge and personal affiliation which would result,
however, could be a significant advantage in effectively
utilizing the combat resources in actual conflict.
3 . Crosstrain Personnel
Section autonomy and mystique may be the most
difficult deficiencies to eliminate. A viable crosstraining
program could be the mechanism by which section interface
problems can be lessened. The key to success in this
endeavor would be to establish the legitimacy of this
program by periodically evaluating staff sections ' knowledge
of the duties and responsibilities of the remaining
sections. The evaluation method to be utilized should be
tailored by the particular Chief of Staff concerned.
E. OPERATIONAL SOLUTION SPACE
The assertion made in Chapter IV that the current level
of expertise of corps staffs is insufficient is likely to
evoke emotionalism, if not intense anger. Yet, an unbiased
study of this issue may prove to substantiate it. "I'/hat
must be emphasized is that environmental factors have been
responsible for this situation and not flagrant incidents
of personal disregard. Samuel P. Huntington, in his
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writings concerning the military profession, asserts the
following:
The variety of conditions under which violence may be
employed and the different forms in v/hich it may be
applied form the basis for sub-professional special-
ization. The larger and more complex the organiza-
tions of violence which an officer is capable of
directing, and the greater number of situations and
conditions under which he can be employed, the higher
is his professional competence. The officer who can
direct the complex activities of a combined operation
involving large-scale sea, air, and land forces is
at the top of his vocation.
fRef 40, p. 7}
The corps staff officer must epitomize these fundamental
truths if the corps fire support process is to be viable.
Three aids to achieving this greater end are proposed.
1 • Planned Corps Professionalism
Current personnel turbulence is the first factor
that must be solved. Assignments to a corps headquarters
must be recognized as a career enhancing tour of duty. A
minimum of three years, tour duration must be required to
stabilize the level of staff expertise. Under the Army's
dual specialty concept, a major part of the Officer
Personnel Management System (OPMS) [^Ref 4l], the position of
"Corps Staff Officer" could be officially recognized as a
valid alternate specialty. A key component of profession-
alism is a specialized core of knowledge. The establish-
ment of this component, by specific design, v/ill avert
chance uncertainties which presently pervade this area.
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2 . Recognition of Feedback
The lack of Battlefield Damage Assessment exempli-
fies another deficient condition which exists. In this
particular case , operational procedures or equipmental
innovations could be contrived in an attempt to close time
and spatial separations on the battlefield. Allocating
targets to weapon systems efficiently does not, in itself,
determine success on the battlefield. Similar to the
necessity in the commercial sector for periodic financial
statements to indicate the success of a profit-oriented
corporation, tangible feedback must be obtained and
evaluated during the course of battle and not solely at the
determination of battle outcome.
3* Result Orientation
Discernible results from changes must, somehow, be
obtained on a regular basis. To this end, measures of
performance and measures of effectiveness (MOE) must be
defined and validated. A measure of performance is a
quantification of what a system does. In the case of a
weapon system, valid measures of performance might be its
maximum range oi- the number of rounds fired per minute. A
measure of effectiveness, however, quantifies v/hat perform-
ance is worth in terms of battle outcome. An example of
this would be the number of enemy targets destroyed, per
unit time. Quite evidently, actual combat results cannot
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be determined dxojr'ins peacetime conditions. Thus, "surrogate
measures of effectiveness" [Ref 42] must be found, which are
attainable. As maintained by Professor James G, Taylor,
"Very often failure to choose the appropriate measures of
effectiveness can lead to completely wrong conclusions as
to preferred alternatives" ^Ref 42] . Some form of opera-
tional combat model, such as computer simulations or inter-
active wargames , may be developed to provide explicit
results to verify the viability of the corps fire support
process. Judgment and experience, however, must also be
utilized to obtain a qualitative validation of this process.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMIVENDATIONS
Though much is taken, much abides; and though
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, v;e are-
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.
Tennyson (1842)
From "Ulysses"
With the same unconquerable soul displayed by Tennyson's
Ulysses, the United States Army must relentlessly pursue the
objective of effective corps fire support. The importance
of achieving this objective cannot be overstated. It is
recognized that optimizing corps fire support will not,
alone, determine the outcome of future v/ars . Yet it is
evident that its role is of major significance to success
in large-scale, ground combat,
A. BASIC CONCLUSIONS
1 . Insufficiency of Corps Fire Support
A realistic appraisal of the effectiveness of corps
fire support, and the viability of related developmental
efforts, has clearly indicated a condition of instifficiency
.
It is similarly evident that a relative increase in the
Soviet threat, in real or perceived terms, has amplified
the significance of this condition. In contrast with the
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Commercial sector, what is at stake is more than mere
financial loss of a corporate enterprise. Instead, hximan
lives and, in the final analysis, our national being are
in jeopardy, \^ile the degree of this insufficiency may be
inconsequentially debated, the recognition of its existence
is adequate to refuse satisfaction with the status quo.
2
.
Essentiality of a Total Systems Approach
The complexity of the corps fire support enigma
established the need for a total systems approach. Table
VIII depicts the interfacing of the pertinent factors
obstructing effective corps fire support, with the proposed
solutions. As noted in the asymmetric distribution of
interface connectivity points ("X"), there is not a simple,
one-to-one, correspondence betv/een table-entry components.
This is indicative of expected "spillover effects" which
characterize complicated interrelationships which exist.
As supported by Stephens, "Managers gain new vision
and ability to comprehend the true nature of organizations
when they think wholistically concerning their total social,
economic, technological and political nature. Managers
unify organizations' purposes, structures, and relationships
through wholistic concepts" [Ref 25, p. 2 09]. A total
systems approach to the corps fire support enigma is a
consequence of the acceptance of complexity as a natural
state, which needs to be intensively managed. Piecemeal
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3 . Necessity for a Fire-Decision Support System
The focus of a total system approach to corps fire
support must include the establishment of a viable fire-
decision support system (FDSS). Without an understandable,
and agreed upon, perception of the operational goals being
sought, developmental and acquisitional processes tend to
be nonproductive in the final analysis. Several rules for
successful decision support systems in the cormnercial sector
have been cited by McCosh and Scott Morton {Ref 33, p. 2l7j
and are listed in Table XIV.
Table XIV
Rules for Successful Decision Support Systems
1. Keep it simple.
2. Tackle significant problems.
3. Don't let the computer people design the model. .
4. Don't let the operations research staff design the
model
,
5. The manager who is responsible for the subject should
be the person who designs the model.
6. Use the staff people to make the model.
7. Test the model and adjust it.
8. Regard the replacement of models by better ones as
evidence of vitality, not of earlier errors.
(a corollary of Rule 1)
Factors such as the criticality of time and the limitations
of existing weapon systems must be included in the military
application of decision support system theory. The only
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location where these factors can be adequately considered
for a corps fire-decision support system is at the Corps
Tactical Operations Center, itself.
4. Requirement for an Implementation Strategy
The most important conclusion to be drawn from this
thesis is the absolute necessity for a v/ell-grounded,
effectual, implementation strategy. Implementation has been
defined b^' Lucas as "the entire change associated with a
new system" LRef 37, p. 76j . Adoption of an explicit
strategy for implementation legitimizes the institution of
behavioral and organizational changes during development of
a corps fire decision support system. Implementation must
also be validated as effectual through continuous evaluation
of the effectiveness of corps fire support. Lucas maintains
that there is no universal procedure for accomplishing this
validation. He suggests, in lieu of complete uncertainty,
that one measure of success that might be utilized is the
degree of user satisfaction. To augTaent this judgmental
measure, quantitative and qualitative measures must be
determined Ref /S?
,
p. 7^] . Regardless of the type or the
quantity of the changes instituted, incremental improve-





B. DISPELLING THE MYTH OF ORIGINALITY
Henry Kissinger once stated that the most frequently
asked question of a foreign policy consultant in Washington
is, "Have you had any new ideas lately?" [Ref 43, p. 89] .
The impetus behind this question, according to Kissinger,
was the apparent misconception that "constant originality
is the essence of foreign policy" (Ref 43, p. 89] .
Kissinger dispels this myth by asserting that, "Most ideas
that masquerade as new ideas in Washington have been aroxind
for quite a long time" (Ref 43, p. 89] . In a similar
fashion, the ideas presented in this thesis are not,
necessarily, revolutionary in nature. Yet, an amalgamation
of these ideas in a single work is not known to exist. The
crucial issue at stake is not whether originality has, or
has not, been generated in resolving the corps fire support
enigma. Instead, it is simply whether corrective actions
needed to solve existing problems, have been successfully
implemented. This must be the prevailing notion.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The objective of this research effort has been to
examine and evaluate the corps fire support process with
its expected, technologically-based, enhancements. 1^^lile
motivated by personal experiences in a corps field artillery
section, individual bias was, hopefully, not a significant
factor in the determination of direction or outcome of the
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analysis. As proposed solutions and conclusions were
derived, introspection was calculatedly performed to insure
their validity. In a similar fashion, specific recommenda-
tions have been compiled. These recommendations should not
be construed as representing the totality of actions needed
to solve the corps fire support enigma. Instead, they are
simply representative of types of actions which should
assist in the resolution of the corps fire support enigma.
1. Identify the Players
Explicit identification of the major and minor
participants in the effort to solve the corps fire support
enigma must be performed at the outset. While the Army
Force Modernication Coordination Office (AFMCO) will be the
staff focal point at Department of the Army level, this
organization cannot be expected to be a panacea. The
Department of the Army (DA) must establish, in specific
terms, the roles to be played by the corps headquarters, the
army branch schools and centers, the research and develop-
mental agencies, AFMCO, and the DA staff sections. It
must also fix the involvement of organizations outside the
immediate sphere of the army, such as sister services and
applicable high- techno logy industries.
2 . Apply Organizational Development Theory
Organizational development (OD) theory has primarily
evolved over the past twenty-five years. In 1974, the Army
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Chief of Staff established an army-wide , derivative of OD
theory, designated as the Organizational Effectiveness (OE)
Program. While no definitive appraisal of the long-term
effectiveness of this effort has been made, its potential
for aiding the solution of the corps fire support enigma is
present. Friedlander and Brown (1974) have depicted the
essence of organizational development, as reproduced in










Figure 8. Approaches to Organizational Development
3 . Recognize the Sources of Resistance to Change
The natural tendency of both human and organiza-
tional entities appears to be a resistance to change. This
resistance may stem from internal or external sources.
Regardless of where they originate, management throughout
the Army must explicitly acknowledge their existence and
consciously reduce their effects. Webber [Ref 21, p. 695J
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has listed these sources as the following:




3. Investment in what will become obsolete
4. Preference for Present System
5. Fear of Loss (of security, status, pov/er
)
6. Rejection of change source
7. Fear of the unknown
4. Stress the Ideal Climate for Change
The most elaborate plans for organizational change
are doomed to failure if a permissive "climate for change"
is not maintained. Once again, Webber has provided the
groundwork for a generalized description of the essential
elements of this climate Refjjl, p. 70l] .
a. Openness
There must be an aggressive commitment between
all organizations and managers to obtain frank feedback on
their performance. Obtaining a viable corps fire support
process must transcend organizational and personal vanities,
b. Honesty
It is essential that the major players involved
in the resolution of the corps fire support enigma are
honest with themselves and other players. Formal safeguard
procedures must be instituted to allow and encourage




"Managers and change agents should not assume
that everyone always resists change. Such an explanation
tends to be self-fulfilling ... " /jlef 21, p. 703] .
Emphasis on this climatic condition should include, when
absolutely necessary, the removal from positions of
personnel who demonstrate refusal or inability to support
the principle.
d. Courage and Commitment
The personnel involved must be convinced that
what they and the organization are doing is beneficial, in
some sense. The "Hawthorne Effect" (Ref 44, p. 493]
,
derived from a 1924 study, documents the significance that
a clear perception of importance by the work force can have
on individual and organizational motivation and perform-
ances ,
5 . Establish Effective Linking Mechanisms
The army must effectively bridge the gaps between
the major players with some form of "linking mechanisms."
One type of linking mechanism has been recently proposed by
AFMCO. Called the Army Modernization Information Memorandum
(AMIM) , this annual, written document will be provided to
"material, combat and training developers, the functional
system managers, and the commanders in the field" Qlef 32,
p. 27J . It will provide detailed information on forty to
fifty new systems. Additionally, a summary of more than
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one hundred other items will complete the document. While
written docximents possess some advantages, the complex and
transient nature of the corps fire support process, alone,
indicates the necessity for additional linking mechanisms.
A more positive and effective means to link the major
players is the establishment of coordinating teams. The
expressed purpose of these fielded teams would be to provide
personal coordination on a continuing basis. For example,
AFMCO needs the means and the authority to physically visit
players, at their installations . Similarly, these players
need the capability to conduct liaison visits with each
other. Essentially, a one-to-one , "equal footing", close
relationship must be effectively established.
6 . Augment Organizations Where Necessary
Spontaneous augmentation of organizations should be
encouraged when it is apparent that end objectives cannot,
otherwise, be obtained. It is recognized that fiscal and
manpower constraints have to be reckoned with. Neverthe-
less prioritization of programs may indicate the sagacity
of shifting resources to accomplish the major portion of
the army objectives. In the solution proposed in Chapter V
of augmenting the corps staff under the Chief of Staff, the
redistribution of personnel authorizations from other corps
staff positions is preferable to the current situation.
The term "management" implies a flexible attitude in the




1. "New Weapons Alone Won't Top Soviets," Army Times,
1 October 1979.
2. "In Brief," Army RD & A , v. 19, No. 6, November-
December 1978.
3. U.S. Department of the Army, The Air-Ground Operations
System
,
Field Manual 100-26, Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, lAarch 1973.
4. U.S. Department of the Army, Staff Officers Field ^/Ianual
Staff Organization and Procedure
,
Field Manual 101-5,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 July
1972.
5. U.S. Department of the Army, Fire Support in Combined
Arms Operations , Field Manual 6-20, V/ashington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, September 1977.
6. Department of Military Art and Engineering, United
States Military Academy, Notes for the Course in the
History of the Military Art , 1964,
7. U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fundamentals of
Artillery Tactics and Techniques , February 1976.
8. U.S. Department of the Army, Combat Intelligence , Field
Manual 30-5, October 1973.




p. 2-3, March-April 1979.
10. U.S. Department of the Array, Field Artillery Battalion ,
LANCE, Field t^anual 6-41, August 1978.
11. Brown, Harold, Dr. Secretary of Defense, "Exploring
Technology," Command Policy , vol. 2, No* 8, p. 2-7,
August 1979.
12. Matloff, Maurice, ed. , Army Historical Series -
American Military History , V7ashington; U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1968.
13. Starry, Donn A. , Gen, "Focus Is 'Central Battle' ," Army ,
p. 30-32, October 1978.
104

14, U.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity,
Architectural Concept for 1985 for U.S. Army Tactical
Command Control, Communications and Intelligence (C^I)
,
IS December 1978,
15, U. S. Congress, Subcommittee on the Department of
Defense , Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Appropria-
tions
,
Part 3, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979.
16
,
Headquarters , USAFTAC/USATRADOC , Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses, II, (Draft) , 1 February 1977.
17, U,S. Army Combined Arras Combat Development Activity,
Tactical Operations System (TOS) Required Operational
Capability (ROC) , 19 May 1978.
18, U,S. Department of the Army, Tacfire , Training Circular
6-1, July 1977.
19, TACFIRE Department, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Amended
Statement of Work: Software Requirement to Support
Corps Field Artillery Section Using Division Artillery
TACFIRE Hardware , June 1979.
20, U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on the Department of
Defense , Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Appropria-
tions , Part 7, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979.





22, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Resource Ma.nage-
ment Study , V/ashington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, February 1979.
23, U.S, Department of the Army, Operations , Field Manual
100-5, Washington: U,S. Government Printing Office,
July 1976.
24, Thompson, William Jonathon, "An Artillery Commander,"
Field Artillery Journal , vol, 40, p, 100-103, May-June
1950.
25, Stephens, James C, Managing Complexity , 2nd ed. ,
Maryland: Lomond Books, 1977.
26, Ippolito, Dennis, The Budget and National Politics ,
San Francisco: Will Freeman and Company, 1978.
27, Downey, J.C.T., ^/Ianagement in the Armed Forces ,
Ne^^^ York: McGraw Hill Co., 1977,
105





29. Cornette , William R. , Dock, Thomas V., Luchsinger,
Vincent P., ed. , MIS, a Managerial Perspective
,
Chicago:
Science Research Associates, Inc., 1977.




ed. , V. Thomas Dock, Vincent
P. Luchsinger, V/illiam R. Cornette, Chicago: Science
Research Associates, Inc., 1977.
31. Orkins , T^atthew J., and Weiss, Stephan F., Backing into
an Information System in MIS, a Managerial Perspective
,
ed.
, v"^ Thomas DoclTJ ^\'7illiam R. Cornette, Vincent P.
Luchsinger, Chicago: Science Research Associates,
Inc., 1977.
32. Lawrence, Richard D., Major-General USA, "Force
Modernization: Big Job, Big Rewards," Army, p. 26-28,
October 1979.
33. McCosh, Andrew M. , and Morton, Michael S. Scott,
Management Decision Support Systems , New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1978.
34. U.S. Department of the Army, The Threat - Organization ,
Tactics and Equipment , Training Circular 4-2,
V/ashington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December
1976.
35. Department of History, United States Military Academy,
Jomini , Clausewitz and Schlieffen , 1969.
36. Morris, William T., Decentralization in Management
Systems , Ohio State University Press, 1976.
37. Lucas, Henry C, Information Systems Concepts For
Management , New York: McGrav/-Hill Book Company, 1978.
38. Clarke, Bruce C, General, Guidelines for the Leader
and the Commander , Pennsylvania, 196 8.
39. Baxter, Lee, "Trainers, Rise Up," Field Artillery
Journal
,
p. 16-20, January- February 1976.
40. Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State ,
Cambridge, Massachussettes : The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1960.
41. U.S. Department of the Array, Officer Professional
Development and Utilization , Pamphlet 600-3, Washington;
U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1977.
106

42. Unpublished classnotes in 0A4S54, Professor James G.
Taylor, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, 1975.
43. Kissinger, Henry A., Bureaucracy and Policymaking:
The Effects of Insiders and Outsiders on the Policy
Process in Readings In American Foreign Policy , ed.
,
Morton H. Halpern and Arnold Kanter , Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1973.
44. Shaler, Michael D., Organization Development in A
Study of Organizational Leadership , ed. , Associates
Office of Military Leadership, United States Military





1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 36 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Professor J.G. Taylor, Code 55 Tw (thesis advisor)2
Department of Operations Analysis
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940






USA CAC & Fort Leaven^Aorth
ATTN: ATZLCA-CI-M (Mr. KitaRogers)
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 6602 7
7. Commander 1
USA Field Artillery Center & School
ATTN: ATSF-CD-TF (Mr. T. Madison)
Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503
8. Commander 1
USA Field Artillery Center & School
ATTN: ATSF-CF (COL Hickman)
Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503
9 Headquarters , Department of the Army 1
Chief, Force Modernization Coordination Office
ATTN: Major General Richard D. Lawrence
Washington, D.C. 20310
10. Headquarters, Department of the Army 1
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations&Plans





11. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
U. S. Army Logistics Management Center










tiveness of corps fire
support through a total
systems approach to the
design and implementa-
tion of a fire-decision
support system.
"less 144
^,V~, l"'°"ess Of corps f,
3^2768 007 97662 4
—1> KNOX LIBRARy
